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Alles erscheint so einfach, alle erforderlichen Kenntnisse erscheinen so flach, alle
Kombinationen so unbedeutend, daß in Vergleichung damit uns die einfachste Aufgabe
der ho¨heren Mathematik mit einer gewissen wissenschaftlichen Wu¨rde imponiert.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
The penalty shootout in soccer is known to be unfair ex-post: the team kicking first
has a significant advantage as verified by theory and proved in practice. A so-called
Catch-Up Rule has been suggested recently for making the shootout fairer. It is
shown that this mechanism does not outperform the less complicated deterministic
Alternating (ABBA) Rule already tried. We introduce the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule,
which always gives the first penalty of the possible sudden death to the team kicking
the second penalty in the first round. The suggested design is revealed to outperform
the Catch-Up and Alternating (ABBA) Rules, while it remains straightforward to
implement and is essentially strategy-proof.
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1 “All appears so simple, all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so plain, all the combinations
so unimportant, that, in comparison with them, the easiest problem in higher mathematics impresses us
with a certain scientific dignity.” (Source: Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Book 1, Chapter 7 – Friction in
War, translated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N. Tru¨bner, 1873. http://clausewitz.com/
readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
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1 Introduction
As financial interests and public scrutiny in sports increase, fairness and integrity gradually
receive a higher weight, and research on these issues is becoming more and more relevant.
Fairness has several interpretations in sports. In the following, one basic principle of
fairness is adopted, namely, that equally skilled competitors should have the same chance
to win. While this is clearly not the only axiomatic property to evaluate sports rules – it is
satisfied even if the outcome of the match is decided by a simple coin toss –, the principle
of equal treatment of equals can be hardly debated.
Many tournament designs seem to violate this simple requirement. For example,
Krumer et al. (2017) show that in round-robin tournaments among three or four symmetric
contestants, there is a first-mover advantage driven by strategic effects arising from the
subgame perfect equilibrium. Krumer and Lechner (2017) give an empirical proof of this
finding. Analogously, the ranking used in Swiss-system tournaments, a design widely used
in chess, fails to incorporate the strength of schedule adequately, therefore it favors players
with an improving performance during the tournament (Csato´, 2013, 2017).
We address the problem of penalty shootouts in soccer (association football) from
the viewpoint of fairness. Before 1970, soccer matches that were tied after extra time
in knockout (elimination) tournaments were either decided by a coin toss or replayed.
However, the events in the 1968 European football championship led FIFA, the international
governing body of association football, to try penalty shootouts (Anbarcı et al., 2018).
According to the existing system of penalty shootouts (IFAB, 2018), the referee tosses
a coin and the winner can decide whether to take the first or the second kick. After that,
the two teams 𝐴 and 𝐵 kick five penalties each in an alternating pattern, which can be
called the 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 mechanism. If the scores are level after the five rounds, the sudden
death stage starts in the same order 𝐴𝐵 with additional rounds of one kick each until the
tie is broken.
Since most penalties are successful in soccer, the player taking the second kick is usually
under greater mental pressure, especially from the third or fourth penalties onward, when a
miss probably means the immediate loss of the match. Consequently, the team kicking first
in a penalty shootout is recognized to win significantly more frequently than 50 percent of
the time (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Da Silva et al.,
2018). In order to reduce this bias, IFAB (International Football Association Board), the
rule making body of soccer, has decided to test the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule (Cohen-Zada
et al., 2017, 2018; Echenique, 2017): the order of the first two penalties (𝐴𝐵) is the mirror
image of the next two (𝐵𝐴), similarly to the serving sequence in a tennis tiebreak.
The trial was initially scheduled at the 2017 UEFA European Under-17 Championship
and the 2017 UEFA Women’s Under-17 Championship, organized in May 2017 (UEFA,
2017b), and was extended to the 2017 UEFA European Under-19 Championship and the
2017 UEFA Women’s Under-19 Championship in the following month (UEFA, 2017a). The
first implementation of the new system was a penalty shootout in the Women’s Under-17
Championship semifinal played by Germany and Norway on 11 May 2017 (Thomson
Reuters, 2017). It was also applied in the 2017 FA Community Shield, where Arsenal, the
winner of the 2017 FA Cup Final, won after an 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 penalty shootout against Chelsea,
the champions of the 2016/17 Premier League.
The current rulebook of soccer, Laws of the Game 2018/19 (IFAB, 2018) explicitly
says in its section discussing future plans that IFAB will focus on fairness and integrity
issues. Furthermore, working with its expert panels, it will consult widely on a number of
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important Law-related topics, including “a potentially fairer system of taking kicks from
the penalty mark”.
Thus it can be no surprise that there exists a growing literature on penalty shootouts
(McGarry and Franks, 2000; Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Jordet et al., 2007; Sainz De Baranda
et al., 2008; Bar-Eli and Azar, 2009; Wilson et al., 2009; Memmert et al., 2013; Hubbard
and Britto, 2014; Dohmen and Sonnabend, 2018; Vandebroek et al., 2018), and, especially,
on their optimal design (Anbarcı et al., 2015, 2018; Brams and Ismail, 2018; Echenique,
2017; Palacios-Huerta, 2012). The latter topic has received some media coverage during the
recent FIFA World Cup, for instance, on the pan-European news media service Euronews
(Euronews, 2018).
Similar problems arise in many other sports (Anbarcı et al., 2018); here, we limit
ourselves to the brief discussion of one additional example. Gonza´lez-Dı´az and Palacios-
Huerta (2016) have obtained a similar result in multi-stage chess contests between two
players: the player drawing the white pieces in the odd games has about 60% chance to
win the match. FIDE, the governing body of international chess competition, has also
recognized the existence of asymmetric psychological pressure, and the colors are reversed
halfway through in matches containing twelve scheduled games since at least the World
Chess Championship 2006, thus one player plays with the white pieces in the 1st, 3rd, 5th,
8th, 10th, 12th games according to the 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵|𝐵𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵𝐴 sequence.
Our point of departure is a central result of Brams and Ismail (2018) that the so-called
Catch-Up Rule makes penalty shootouts substantially fairer. A modified version of this
mechanism – called the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule – is introduced here, which prohibits the
team kicking the first penalty to be the first-mover in the sudden death stage.
The contribution of the current paper can be summarized as follows: (1) we show
that the Catch-Up Rule does not outperform the simpler and already tried Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule in the model of Brams and Ismail (2018), something which substantially
decreases the importance of one of their main findings; (2) we present that the Adjusted
Catch-Up Rule is fairer than both alternative penalty shootout designs.
The relevance of the current research is reinforced by our observation that the governing
bodies in soccer seem to be increasingly open to suggestions from academic research. Besides
the trial of the 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 rule for penalty shootouts, three cases are worth mentioning. First,
the draw for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, unlike the previous editions of the tournament,
determined all pots by each national team’s October 2017 FIFA World Ranking. This
reform was probably inspired by Guyon (2015). Second, after the official soccer ranking
was often subject to criticism (see, e.g. Lasek et al. (2016)), the FIFA Council announced
a new formula for the FIFA / Coca-Cola World Ranking on 10 June 2018 (FIFA, 2018).
Finally, Dura´n et al. (2017) constructed an alternative schedule for the FIFA World Cup
South American Qualifiers that overcomes the main drawbacks of the previous one, which
was unanimously approved by all CONMEBOL (South American Football Confederation)
members and was used in the qualifier tournament for the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the penalty shootout designs to be
analyzed thoroughly in Section 3. Some concluding thoughts are offered in Section 4.
2 Penalty shootout rules
Soccer is typically a game with a low number of scores, therefore ties (even the result of
0-0) are relatively common. Since in knockout (elimination) tournaments only one team
advances to the next round, these ties should be broken. Furthermore, penalty shootout
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may also be a special tie-breaking rule in round-robin tournaments. For example, in the
group stage of the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, if two teams, which have
the same number of points and the same number of goals scored and conceded, play their
last group match against each other and are still equal at the end of that match, their final
rankings are determined by kicks from the penalty mark, provided that no other teams
within the group have the same number of points on completion of all group matches
(UEFA, 2018, Paragraph 20.02). Despite the restrictive conditions, this is not only a
theoretical possibility: in the elite round of 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship
qualification, Poland overtook Ireland in Group 7, and Belgium was ranked higher than
Spain in Group 8 due to this particular rule.
According to the current rulebook of soccer, Laws of the Game 2018/19, “when
competition rules require a winning team after a drawn match or home-and-away tie, the
only permitted procedures to determine the winning team are: a) away goals rule; b) two
equal periods of extra time not exceeding 15 minutes each; c) kicks from the penalty mark”
(IFAB, 2018, Section 10). In the latter case, five kicks are taken alternately by the teams
such that the team that wins a coin toss decides whether to take the first or second kick.
If the scores are level after both teams have taken five kicks, the kicks continue until one
team scores a goal more than the other from the same number of kicks (sudden death).
This rule is called the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) Rule in penalty shootouts (Brams and Ismail,
2018).
The team favored by the coin toss almost always chooses to kick first, in order to put
psychological pressure on the other team. More than 90% of coaches and players asked in
a survey want to go first (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010). However, an interesting
exception was a quarterfinal of the 2018 FIFA World Cup when the Croatian team captain
Luka Modric´ has chosen to kick the second penalties despite winning the coin toss against
Russia (Mirror, 2018).
Empirical research supports this decision: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) have
observed that the team kicking first wins the penalty shootout with a 60.5% probability
(the dataset contained 269 shootouts between 1970 to 2008), Kocher et al. (2012) have
found this number to be 53.3% (based on 540 shootouts from 1970 to 2003), while Palacios-
Huerta (2014) has reported a 60.6% advantage (the dataset contained 1001 shootouts
between 1970 and 2013). Finally, Da Silva et al. (2018) have shown that the first-mover
wins with a probability of 59.5% (on the basis of 232 shootouts from 1970 to 2016).
A partial solution to this bias would be to toss a coin at the beginning of each round
to determine the order of kicking (Brams and Ismail, 2018). It is fair ex-ante but not
ex-post because a team winning, for example, three subsequent coin tosses would enjoy a
significant advantage.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to reduce the unfair advantage is the Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule, when the first-mover in a given round kicks the second penalty in the next
round, so the order of the penalty kicks is 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴. It is not analyzed in Brams and Ismail
(2018), however, the authors consider it as a potential candidate to be implemented.
In order to mitigate the imbalance caused by coin tossing, Brams and Ismail (2018)
suggest a mechanism called the Catch-Up Rule, which takes into account the results of
penalties in the preceding round to give an opportunity for the team performing worse to
catch up. Denote the two teams by 𝐴 and 𝐵. Assume that 𝐴 kicks first, so it is advantaged
in a particular round. In the next round, 𝐵 will kick first except if 𝐴 fails and 𝐵 succeeds.
Our proposal is based on the Catch-Up Rule, but it contains a slight but significant
improvement. The penalty shootout is essentially composed of two parts: the first five
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rounds, and the possible sudden death stage. Therefore, it makes sense to balance the
advantage of the first-mover by making it disadvantaged at the beginning of sudden death.
Formally, if 𝐴 kicks first in the first round, then 𝐵 kicks first in the sixth round (provided
that it is reached). Under the original Catch-Up Rule, it is possible that 𝐴 kicks first in
the sixth round, for instance, when it leads by 4-3 after four rounds, but 𝐴 fails and 𝐵
succeeds in the fifth round of penalty kicks. This variant of the Catch-Up Rule, which a
priori fixes the team that starts the sudden death, is called the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule.
Table 1: An illustration of penalty shootout rules
Rule 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴 Catch-Up Adj. Catch-Up
Team Red Blue Red Blue Red Blue Red Blue
1st kick 4 4 4 4
2nd 4 4 4 4
3rd 7 7 7 7
4th 7 7 7 7
5th 4 4 4 4
6th 4 4 4 4
7th 4 7 7 7
8th 7 4 4 4
9th 7 7 4 4
10th 4 4 7 7
11th 4 4 4 4
12th 4 4 4 4
13th 4 4 7 4
14th 7 7 4 7
Table 1 shows an example of how the four rules work. The Red team is the first kicker,
4 means a successful, and 7 indicates an unsuccessful penalty. Since the result after
five rounds is 3-3, the sudden death stage starts, where the Red team kicks first in the
sixth round according to the Catch-Up Rule as the Blue team was the first-mover in the
previous round, but the Blue team kicks first in the sixth round if the Adjusted Catch-Up
Rule is used because it was disadvantaged in the first round.
3 Comparison of the three penalty shootout designs
In this section, the three mechanisms presented before will be analyzed with respect to
fairness and other issues. We will not discuss the standard 𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵 rule because it has
already been investigated – and has been found to be unfair – by Brams and Ismail (2018).
3.1 Fairness: a simple model which solely depends on the order
Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010, p. 2558) provide empirical probabilities with which
a team scores a penalty on each of rounds from 1 to 5. These values are presented in
Table 2. It can be seen that the team kicking first in a given round always scores with
a higher probability, thus, following Brams and Ismail (2018), we adopt the reasonable
assumption that the probability of a successful kick depends only on whether the team
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Table 2: Penalty shootout success rates per round
First kicker Second kicker
Round 1 0.79 0.72
Round 2 0.82 0.77
Round 3 0.77 0.64
Round 4 0.74 0.68
Round 5 0.74 0.67
Source: Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010, p. 2558)
kicks first or second in a round. The advantaged team has a probability 𝑝 of scoring, and
the disadvantaged team has a probability 𝑞 of scoring. Similarly to Brams and Ismail
(2018), our baseline choice is 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3, which are close to the empirical success
rates given in Table 2 (especially in the last three rounds), and provide about 60% chance
of winning for the first kicker as in practice.
To illustrate the model, Brams and Ismail (2018) analyze the Catch-Up Rule for a
penalty shootout over two rounds and derive that 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3 result in:
∙ the probability of team 𝐴 winning is 𝑃 2(𝐴) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;2
∙ the probability of team 𝐵 winning is 𝑃 2(𝐵) = 39/144 ≈ 0.270;
∙ the probability of a tie is 𝑃 2(𝑇 ) = 64/144 ≈ 0.444.
If there is a tie after two rounds, the shootout goes to sudden death. Assume that
team 𝐴 kicks first and let 𝑊 (𝐴) be the probability of winning for team 𝐴 in the sudden
death stage. The Catch-Up, Adjusted Catch-Up, and Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rules coincide
in sudden death, the calculations of Brams and Ismail (2018) remain valid, that is,
𝑊 (𝐴) = 1− 𝑞 + 𝑝𝑞2− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞 . (1)
For 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3, we get 𝑊 (𝐴) = 10/19 ≈ 0.526.
If the penalty shootout is played over two rounds before sudden death, the probability
of a tie is 𝑃 2(𝑇 ) = 64/144. Under the Catch-Up Rule, 𝐴 kicks first in the third round with
a probability of 58/144 ≈ 0.403, while 𝐵 kicks first in the third round with a probability
of 6/144 ≈ 0.042. Consequently, the probability that team 𝐴 wins is
𝑄2(𝐴) = 𝑃 2(𝐴) + 58144 ×
10
19 +
6
144 ×
9
19 =
1413
2736 ≈ 0.516.
On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule guarantees the first penalty in the
sudden death for team 𝐵, hence the probability that team 𝐴 wins under this mechanism is
𝑄2(𝐴) = 𝑃 2(𝐴) + 64144 ×
9
19 =
1355
2736 ≈ 0.495.
We provide a more detailed discussion of the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule because it
has not been provided by Brams and Ismail (2018), but it can contribute to a better
understanding of the model. There are three ways for team 𝐴 to win a penalty shootout
over two rounds:
2 Brams and Ismail (2018, p. 188) contain a rounding error. Superscript 2 indicates that the probability
concerns a penalty shootout over two rounds.
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I) 2-0: 𝐴 scores on both rounds while 𝐵 fails to score on both
On the first round, 𝐴 succeeds and 𝐵 fails with probability 𝑝(1 − 𝑞). On the
second round, 𝐵 kicks first and fails, while 𝐴 kicks second and succeeds with
probability (1− 𝑝)𝑞. The joint probability of this outcome over both rounds is
𝑝(1− 𝑞)(1− 𝑝)𝑞.
II) 2-1: 𝐴 scores on both rounds while 𝐵 fails to score on one of these rounds
There are two subcases:
∙ 𝐵 scores on the first round
On this round, both teams succeed with probability 𝑝𝑞. On the second
round, 𝐵 kicks first and fails, while 𝐴 kicks second and scores with
probability (1− 𝑝)𝑞. The joint probability over both rounds is 𝑝𝑞(1− 𝑝)𝑞.
∙ 𝐵 scores on the second round
On the first round, 𝐴 succeeds and 𝐵 fails with probability 𝑝(1− 𝑞). On
the second round, 𝐵 kicks first and succeeds, after which 𝐴 also scores,
with probability 𝑝𝑞. The joint probability over both rounds is 𝑝(1− 𝑞)𝑝𝑞.
Hence the probability of the outcome 2-1 is
𝑝𝑞(1− 𝑝)𝑞 + 𝑝(1− 𝑞)𝑝𝑞.
III) 1-0: 𝐴 scores on one round while 𝐵 fails to score on both rounds
There are two subcases:
∙ 𝐴 scores on the first round
On this round, 𝐴 succeeds and 𝐵 fails with probability 𝑝(1− 𝑞). On the
second round, both teams fail with probability (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞). The joint
probability over both rounds is 𝑝(1− 𝑞)(1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞).
∙ 𝐴 scores on the second round
On the first round, both teams fail with probability (1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑞).
On the second round, 𝐵 kicks first and fails, after which 𝐴 succeeds,
with probability (1 − 𝑝)𝑞. The joint probability over both rounds is
(1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)(1− 𝑝)𝑞.
Thus the probability of the outcome 1-0 is
𝑝(1− 𝑞)(1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞) + (1− 𝑝)(1− 𝑞)(1− 𝑝)𝑞.
Using the assumption 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3, we get that:
∙ the probability of team 𝐴 winning is 𝑃 2(𝐴) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
∙ the probability of team 𝐵 winning is 𝑃 2(𝐵) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
∙ the probability of a tie is 𝑃 2(𝑇 ) = 62/144 ≈ 0.431.
It is not surprising that this rule gives equal winning probabilities for the two teams over
two rounds.
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The Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule gives the first penalty in the sudden death for team 𝐴
because it is the third round, so the probability that team 𝐴 wins is
𝑄2(𝐴) = 𝑃 2(𝐴) + 62144 ×
10
19 =
1399
2736 ≈ 0.511.
To summarize, while all the three alternative designs tend to equalize the winning
probabilities compared to the Standard (𝐴𝐵𝐴𝐵) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
seems to be the closest to fairness: the Catch-Up and Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rules give
100× (0.516/0.484− 1) ≈ 6.8% and 4.64% advantage for the team kicking the first penalty,
respectively, while the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule leads to an advantage of 1.92% for the
other team in a penalty shootout over two rounds with sudden death.
Table 3: The probability that 𝐴 wins including sudden death (𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3)
Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule
1 Round 0.526 0.526 0.526
2 Rounds 0.516 0.495 0.511
3 Rounds 0.518 0.515 0.519
4 Rounds 0.513 0.501 0.508
5 Rounds 0.514 0.509 0.515
6 Rounds 0.512 0.504 0.507
7 Rounds 0.512 0.507 0.513
8 Rounds 0.511 0.504 0.506
The winning probabilities of the advantaged team – which kicks the first penalty – are
shown in Table 3 for penalty shootouts lasting eight or fewer predetermined rounds with a
subsequent sudden death when 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3. The probabilities for the Catch-Up
Rule have already been reported by Brams and Ismail (2018) up to five rounds.
All the three methods, especially the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule, exhibit a small odd-
even effect: their bias is greater for an odd number of predetermined rounds. As expected,
they make the contest fairer if the number of rounds increases. The simplest Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule is better than the Catch-Up Rule for an even number of rounds, while the
latter has a marginal advantage for an odd number of rounds.
However, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule consistently outperforms both. The smallest
imbalance can be observed for a penalty shootout over four rounds, followed by sudden
death if the shootout is still unresolved. In this case, the team kicking first has only 0.58%
more chance to win under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule.
Until now, we have investigated only the case of 𝑝 = 3/4 and 𝑞 = 2/3. Figure 1 plots
the winning probabilities of team 𝐴 using the presented rules for different values of 𝑝 as a
function of 𝑞 such that 0.5 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑝 since penalties are usually successful. It shows that
the order of these designs with respect to fairness is not influenced by the particular values
chosen: the Catch-Up and the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rules are almost indistinguishable,
and the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule turns out to be the best as before. It can also be seen
that all mechanisms are fairer if 𝑝 is closer to 𝑞 as intuition suggests.
Unfortunately, there is no hope to analytically derive conditions for 𝑝 and 𝑞 which
make the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer than the other two designs even in this simple
mathematical model. The reason is that the five rounds of penalties mean 210 = 1024
different cases, and the probability of each is given by a formula containing the product
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Figure 1: The probability that 𝐴 wins a shootout over five rounds including sudden death
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65
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0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
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Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8
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0.54
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of ten items from the set of 𝑝, 𝑞, (1 − 𝑝), and (1 − 𝑞). Nevertheless, Figure 1 strongly
supports this finding by reinforcing the lack of non-linear effects.
3.2 Fairness: empirical round dependent success rates
In the following, the three rules will be compared with considering the empirical round
dependent probabilities from Table 2. However, since success rates in the sudden death
stage are uncertain due to the small sample size, it is assumed that the former mathematical
model holds after five rounds with the fixed probabilities 𝑝 and 𝑞. Figure 2 presents the
results of these calculations. While the Catch-Up Rule is closer to fairness on the basis
of the empirical data than the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
remains the winner.
We have attempted to determine what are the conditions for scoring probabilities 𝑝
and 𝑞(≤ 𝑝) in the sudden death stage which guarantee that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule
is fairer than the other designs. Formally, assume that the following values are known:
∙ 𝑃 5(𝐴): the probability that 𝐴 wins a penalty shootout over five rounds without
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Figure 2: The empirical probability that 𝐴 wins a penalty
shootout over five rounds including sudden death
(2/3; 3/5) (3/4; 2/3) (3/4; 3/5)
0.49
0.5
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0.53
0.54
Probabilities of scoring in the sudden death (𝑝; 𝑞)
Catch-Up Rule Adjusted Catch-Up Rule Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule
sudden death under the Catch-Up Rule;
∙ 𝑃 5𝐴(𝑇 ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the
Catch-Up Rule, and 𝐴 kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule;
∙ 𝑃 5𝐵(𝑇 ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the
Catch-Up Rule, and 𝐵 kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule.
Furthermore, denote by 𝛼 the value of winning the sudden death by the team that kicks
first in this stage. Formula (1) implies 0.5 ≤ 𝛼 because of the assumption 𝑞 ≤ 𝑝 in order
to incorporate the psychological effects already mentioned.
Then the overall probability of winning for team 𝐴 under the Catch-Up Rule is
𝑃 5(𝐴) + 𝑃 5𝐴(𝑇 )× 𝛼 + 𝑃 5𝐵(𝑇 )× (1− 𝛼) , (2)
while the overall probability of winning for team 𝐴 under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is
𝑃 5(𝐴) +
(︁
𝑃 5𝐴(𝑇 ) + 𝑃 5𝐵(𝑇 )
)︁
× (1− 𝛼) . (3)
The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if the value obtained from (3)
is closer to 0.5 than the value obtained from (2). By using the round dependent empirical
scoring probabilities provided in Table 2, this leads to 0.5 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 𝛼(𝐶𝑈) ≈ 0.6569. Thus
the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule becomes fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if
0.5 ≤ 1− 𝑞 + 𝑝𝑞2− 𝑝− 𝑞 + 2𝑝𝑞 ≤ 𝛼(𝐶𝑈) ⇐⇒
1− 2𝛼(𝐶𝑈) + 𝛼(𝐶𝑈)𝑝
1− 𝑝− 𝛼 + 2𝛼(𝐶𝑈)𝑝 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑝.
An analogous calculation results in 𝛼(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) ≈ 0.6252.
The values (𝑝; 𝑞), 𝑞 ≤ 𝑝 for the success rates in sudden death that increase the fairness
of the Adjusted Cacth-Up Rule compared to the other two penalty shootout designs with
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Figure 3: The fixed scoring probabilities in sudden death which guarantee that
the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than the other penalty shootout designs
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the empirical probabilities provided in Table 2 are plotted in Figure 3: the suggested
mechanism outperforms the Catch-Up Rule in the region indicated by the blue vertical
lines, while it is preferred to the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule in the region indicated by the
green horizontal lines (the latter is a subset of the former). Since any reasonable value of
𝑞 is between these bounds, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is the closest to fairness among
the three designs even with the empirical round dependent success rates of Apesteguia
and Palacios-Huerta (2010).
3.3 Beyond fairness: expected length and strategy-proofness
In our model, the expected length of the sudden death stage is governed by the values of
𝑝 and 𝑞: it is 1/(𝑝+ 𝑞 − 2𝑝𝑞), the same for all mechanisms (Brams and Ismail, 2018). The
Catch-Up and Adjusted Catch-Up Rules differ only in which team kicks the first penalty
of the sudden death. However, the probability of reaching this stage is greater with the
(Adjusted) Catch-Up Rule than with the Alternating (𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule as Figure 2 illustrates
on the basis of some particular values of 𝑝 and 𝑞 as well as the empirical round dependent
success rates given in Table 2. Consequently, the former mechanisms can make the penalty
shootout more exciting.
It has been presented recently that certain sports rules do not satisfy incentive com-
patibility, that is, a team might be better off by exerting a lower effort (Csato´, 2018,
2019; Dagaev and Sonin, 2018; Kendall and Lenten, 2017; Vong, 2017). The Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule is not vulnerable to any kind of strategic manipulation since neither team
can influence the order of shooting. Brams and Ismail (2018) prove that no team is
interested in missing a kick under the Catch-Up Rule if (𝑝− 𝑞) ≤ 1/2, which seems likely
to be met in practice. The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule presents fewer opportunities to change
the order of kicking the penalties since the first-mover in sudden death is fixed, therefore
11
Figure 4: The probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds goes to sudden death
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it also satisfies strategy-proofness if the condition (𝑝− 𝑞) ≤ 1/2 holds.
4 Conclusions
Tournament organizers supposedly design fair rules. However, the standard soccer penalty
shootout mechanism contains a well-known bias in favor of the first shooter, which is a
problem because an order of actions that provides an ex-post advantage to one team may
harm efficiency by reducing the probability of the stronger team to win. Consequently, we
agree with IFAB and other researchers that there is little excuse to continue the use of the
current rule for penalty shootouts.
We have demonstrated by a mathematical model that the recently suggested Catch-Up
Rule is not worth implementing since it is not necessarily fairer than the simpler Alternating
(𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐴) Rule already tried. On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule seems to be
a promising candidate if the aim is to make penalty shootouts as fair as possible and more
exciting.
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